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Abstract: This article explores the history of resonant idea that intelligence is locked in a struggle 
to outpace its deepest past so as to vouchsafe its furthest future. That is, can Homo sapiens escape 
its passively inherited evolutionary heritage in order to actively build something more properly 
universal? The article traces this dramatic notion across various thinkers of the 1800s and 1900s, 
locating its genesis in the notion that the human is the creature who increasingly rejects the 
merely natural so as to rely on its own artefacts and artifice. Because it answers to purposeful 
values that outstrip purposeless and unintelligent nature, intelligence incrementally replaces the 
accidental with the deliberate and designed so as to increasingly come to reside in a world entirely 
of its own making. This, however, comes with its own risks. The history of thinking upon the risks 
internal to our progressively artificial world is recounted, before an retracing of some of the most 
dramatic visions yet provided of what humanity's longest-term future could be if we prove able 
to outmanoeuvre our contingent terrestrial heritage so as to deliberately fabricate for ourselves a 
resplendent future in the stars. 
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1  
Immanuel Kant ([1784] 2007, 110) once wrote that the human is not ‘guided by 
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instinct or cared for and instructed by innate knowledge’ but, instead, must 
‘produce everything out [it]self ’: 
The invention of his means of nourishment, his clothing, his external safety and 
defense (for which nature gave him neither the horns of the steer, nor the claws of 
the lion, nor the teeth of the dog, but merely his hands), all gratification that can 
make life agreeable […] should be entirely his own work. In this it seems to have 
pleased nature to exercise its greatest frugality, and to have measured out its animal 
endowment so tightly, so precisely to the highest need of an initial existence, as 
though it willed that the human being, if he were someday to have labored himself 
form the greatest crudity to the height of the greatest skillfulness, the inner 
perfection of his mode of thought, and (as far as is possible on earth) thereby to 
happiness, may have only his own merit alone to thank for it; just as if it had been 
more concerned about his rational self-esteem than about his well-being. 
The human is the self-constituting animal. This is because—somewhere, 
somewhen, and somehow across the past ~50,000 years since the emergence of 
Behaviorally Modern Humans—this creature began to take itself to be responsible 
for its internal states and its worldly actions. It is this and this alone that, in the 
first place, grants the human an ‘objective world’. To be human is to have a ‘world 
in view’ (McDowell 2009), in the strong sense of ownership that is earnt through 
becoming entitled to such a status. Because the human has become assertorically 
answerable to what it holds to be objectively thus-and-so precisely inasmuch as it 
acknowledges the obligation to correct these assertions when they are proven 
unsound. (Note that this is ‘accountable’ in a richly normative sense: in that its 
meaning can only be grasped with reference to ‘values’—concerning what should 
or ought to be so—that will always be semantically in excess of the mere ‘facts’ of 
what has and does happen (see Koons, 2019).) In this, we became creatures that 
actively produce ourselves inasmuch as we have become—to a non-trivial 
degree—accountable for what it is that we are. In this sense, ever since it appeared 
on this planet, intelligence has always been in the business of  artificializing itself. This is 
because the human actively forges ‘what it is that it is’, and it is thus its own 
artefact (Negarestani 2018), rather than it passively inheriting the answer to this 
question from nature as a well-defined bundle of instincts. The human is an open 
question: an ongoing task of creation; not a finished creature. We are as much 
our own technological artefact as we are an evolved organism. And because the 
human produces itself in this way, in the sense that it holds itself accountable for 
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its own actions and thus actively fabricates what it presently is and what it will 
become, the human animal has a history rather than a mere nature.1 As Nietzsche 
([1887] 1967, 80) realized, ‘only that which has no history is definable’. We have a 
history because our definition is an open question. But it is also because of  this that 
we so much as even have a future. 
It is only because we have a history that we even began to come to care, across 
the long millennia, for our collective future, as a species, in its increasingly long-
term sweep. 
2 
We have a history in that we increasingly come to apprehend ourselves as self-
correcting animals who cannot but pursue ever more encompassing accountability 
for our model of ourselves and our objective world, and, through this 
apprehension, became increasingly able of self-constituting what it is that we are. 
And it is alone because we acknowledge that we have an open history in this 
way—rather than a completed nature—that we also came to acknowledge that 
the human species represents a project and vocation rather than a biophysical 
germline alone and, through this, we collaterally became answerable across the 
ages to the precept that our species-project can triumphantly succeed or abortively fail. 
That is, we came, across the long centuries, to care more and more for our future 
as a historical project; and, in the past few centuries, acknowledged that it may 
end in inglorious and irreversible extinction; and we came to care to the precise 
extent that we came to understand that our place within the future remains 
precarious.  
It is this summons to responsibility, of coming to answer ‘the demands that 
the future makes upon us’ to emend a phrase of Reinhard Koselleck ([1979] 2004, 
3), that drags our purview further and further into deep futurity within the 
present moment. Yet this temporal structure is also irreducibly a historical 
inheritance, one that we all necessarily derive from the upswell of our collective 
 
1 Robert Brandom (2009, 111) marks the ‘distinction between thing that have natures and things that have 
histories’. ‘Physical things such as electrons and aromatic compounds would be paradigmatic of the first class’, 
he explains, ‘while cultural formations such as English Romantic poetry and Ponzi schemes would be 
paradigmatic of the second’. 
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past as a self-making species. That is, one is only able to acknowledge the human 
project of self-betterment because of one’s placement within a wider history of 
human progress; yet this task of improvement thereby also remains constitutively 
incomplete and unfinished in the here-and-now; for, indeed, the ‘Good’ isn’t truly 
the ‘Good’ if it isn’t also pursuance of the ‘Better’; such that it is because of our 
historical inheritance of a project of ongoing enlightening that we are even so 
much as even motivated (that is, obligated) to undertake ever greater 
responsibility for our precarious placement upon this planet. 
Of course, this has reached an important threshold in our current moment. 
Residing in the opening decades of the 21st-century, we have our being within a 
‘culture of prediction’ (Heymann et al. 2017) characterized by incrementally long-
range and high-resolution models. There is a growing integration of the future 
into the present that, as Riel Miller (2018) declares, demands of us the aptitude of 
‘futures literacy’. By way of anthropogenic climate change, our horizon of moral 
culpability extends to indefinitely many future generations. Such reasoning 
reaches even more astronomical catchments when considering the ‘opportunity 
cost’ of delaying space colonization efforts (Bostrom 2003), given that a growing 
pantheon of existential risks face humanity as a planetary collective—from 
nanotech to supernovae, from pandemic to gamma-ray burst—such that it 
becomes our primary obligation to build ‘existential redundancy’ into our 
species-project by spreading across multiple globes so as to fulfil our duty of care 
to protecting the potential existence of possibly quattuordecillions of future 
human souls should we become spacefaring (Ćirković 2002). 
Yet, in the longest-durational sweep of human history, it was only by 
progressively undertaking responsibility for ourselves and our values that we were 
summoned to these future-oriented tasks of planetary-scale prediction, 
macrostrategy, and global risk mitigation. Or, we only came to care about the 
future when we realized that our axiological values remain precarious within it, 
and this appreciation came from the oncoming awareness (beginning at the 
medieval inception of modernity and culminating during the ensuing 
enlightenment) that our moral values are entirely our entirely own responsibility. 
It came from the realization that, because our values are entirely the product of 
our own active self-election and not given to us or imprinted on us by 
 THOMAS MOYNIHAN 75 
 
independent nature, they would not persist within widest cosmos independently 
of our ongoing championship and stewardship of them, such that, because of this, 
they remain entirely our own responsibility and correlatively demand our vigilant 
guardianship. It was this that first summoned us to care about our future (and, 
thus, the modernity-defining projects of prediction and preemption). Indeed, 
though the Ancients no doubt experienced calamities and natural disasters as 
tragic, they by and large interpreted them as the dictates of divine judiciary or 
personified fortuna. Inscrutable and cruel though the sentencing may be, it 
remained interpreted in moralized terms. Mental values were mingled with 
factual nature such that the true moral stakes involved in natural disaster could 
not be cogently articulated in a way that would meaningfully motivate anyone to 
take practical, prognostic, and preventative action. This is why rational prognosis 
did not exist in the ancient world, but divination did. Or, it is only by separating 
fact from value that one becomes concerned for potential fact of the end of all 
value and, thus, answers to the precept that one must do something about this 
threat. As such, it was only upon the nominalist awakening of the late Middle 
Ages—and its teaching that the cosmos does not necessarily have a structure that 
accords with our intuitive mental and moral categories—that there was first 
inculcated a semantic responsivity to nature’s non-responsivity to our 
expectations and demands. And, as historicism took hold across the ensuing 
centuries, this catastrophic appreciation of nature’s autonomy from moral 
structure and decree became tensed—at the modernity’s growing edge—as 
looming disaster on the horizon. Following the mathematization of anticipation 
(due to the early modern consolidation of probabilism and calculus across the 
sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-centuries), the ambitious ideal of a 
project of combined social prognostication and planning took hold during the 
nineteenth-century before becoming institutionalized, bureaucratized and 
deputized across the twentieth (following the twin turmoils of the World Wars and 
their mass mobilization of state power). Indeed, it was during the interwar period 
that anticipation of the longest-term future of intelligence within the cosmos 
finally became widely available (that is, the notion of the human vocation of self-
fabrication was extended beyond our planetary environment), and, having also 
come to an firm understanding that the self-constituting creature is by its very 
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essence also the artificializing and technologizing creature, so too did this 
anticipation of far-flung futurity and vocation become irremediably entangled 
with extrapolations apropos the perils and promises of unbounded automation at 
potentially cosmological scales. It is to this nexus of ideas that we turn our 
attention: to the anticipations of extinction and flourishing as a function of 
intelligence’s vocation of artificialization and automation during the gestation of 
the atomic age. 
3 
But first, a comment on what it is to have a history. A history is here conceptualized 
as the product of autonomous actions rather than heteronomous causes. Autonomy 
supposes doing something because it is right in some important sense that extends 
beyond doing something merely because it accords with the parochialities and 
proclivities of egoism and self-interest or the contingent biases one inherits from 
one’s personal upbringing and spatiotemporal locality (indeed, if one is acting 
purely because of one’s desires then one is not ‘free’ but is truly a prisoner to their 
drive-states—such that ‘freedom’ genuinely is ‘freedom to do the right thing’). 
Autonomy, in other words, is doing something in pursuance of a value (an ‘ought’ 
or ‘should’) whose shepherding content cannot be exhaustively captured by 
pointing to facts-of-the-matter alone (whereas heteronomy is doing something 
purely because of contingent facts rather than justifying reasons). 
A history, then, is a history (in the sense pursued here of a progressive series 
of self-constituting efforts) insofar as it is the warp and weft of autonomous 
actions. Of course, we are not always doing the things we do for edifying reasons—
in fact, we are most of the time failing our prerogative and acting perversely from 
heteronomous causes—but this is precisely why we have a history in the sense of an 
incomplete and open-ended task. That is, our perennial failures are no 
irrecoverable inditement on the content of the goals we fallibly pursue through 
time. However, those that do not appreciate this truth may accordingly become 
disillusioned with the very legitimacy of ‘goals’ as such. In line with this, Robert 
Brandom (2014) has recently identified ‘genealogy’ as the philosophical endeavor 
consisting in the attempt to reduce all of our autonomous reasons for saying and 
doing what we say and do to heteronomous causes. The main culprits are, of 
course, those masters of suspicion—Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and more recently 
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Foucault—who attempt to explain away all justifying reasons as the effects of 
contingent causes throughout our past. The genealogist, that is, offers ‘natural 
histories of the advent of beliefs’: ‘[n]atural, causal processes of belief-formation 
are put in place of rational ones’ in order to unmask the ‘pretensions’ of rationality 
(Brandom 2014). In contradistinction to this approach, we have just put forth an 
argument for the emergence of humanity’s anticipation of long-term futurity as 
the product of a rational procedure and program (i.e. as something shepherded 
by the rational norm of self-betterment and self-improvement) rather than the 
blind effect of contingent causes. That is, we came to so much as even be able to 
think about long-term futurity as a product of our progressive undertaking of self-
responsibility as a species across our history. We came to care about the future 
inasmuch as we assiduously cultivated the rational ability to act beyond—and, 
indeed, in spite of—our genealogical heritage as a biophysical germline of 
appetitive organisms so as to secure our future as a rational agency and 
community of autonomous selves.  
For epistemological and semantic reasons that Brandom (2019) eloquently 
elucidates, the genealogist is wrong-headed in their reductive vision of history as 
a congerie and cascade of causes alone. But, still, it is undeniably also true that 
we humans remain both a historical project of ethical self-betterment and an 
evolutionary product of blind terrestrial evolution, such that we may always fail 
and the genealogical aspect of our nature (i.e. the fact that we are organisms with 
evolved, and thus unreasoned and unreasonable, dispositions) can still get the 
better of us. As Hans Blumenberg (2006, 550-1) liked to point out, it is for these 
reasons that humanity is the only animal that can existentially ‘fail’ itself. We are 
thus beholden to ‘existenzrisiko’ or ‘existential risk’: 
Man is the risk-taking creature that can abort himself. […] Now, the statemen of 
‘risks of existence’ applies to all living beings. With the difference, of course, that 
for humans the moment of riskiness refers not only to naked subsistence but to success 
in life. Only man can live and be unfulfilled. [Thus] it is precisely the fact that 
human civilization has begun to recognize the threat of existential risks that 
suggests that the human organism has ceased to participate in the biological trials 
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of the risks of existence through evolution.2 
In other words, through fabricating itself—and manufacturing ‘what it is that it 
is’ through the designs and artifices of rationality—the human correlatively also 
becomes the unique animal that can abort itself. And, as ever with the self-
fabricating animal, this is inseparably also a question of technics and technology. 
With the invention of automated warfare, and atomic fission, this capacity for 
abortive accident became scalable from the factory-floor to the earthly-expanse. 
For, as the thinkers we are about to explore all variously realized, the 
technological power to avert existential catastrophe is also the power requisite to 
trigger it. 
4 
Thus, the vocation of the self-constituting being is irremediably shot through with 
risk; indeed, it is constituted and commenced by this very risk-ladenness, inasmuch as 
acknowledging peril is what compels us to reason ever-better inasmuch as, at the 
limit, we acknowledge that, should we reason wrongly, we may never reason ever 
again. And, as is unavoidably the case in the activities of free (i.e. self-designing) 
beings, an ineliminable weight of this risk derives unavoidably from ourselves and 
our own designs. For, if this were not so, we would not be ‘sufficient to have stood, 
though free to fall’ (as Milton’s deity so auspiciously put it). Not only are we 
‘responsible’ for averting natural disasters insofar as it is only by acknowledging 
this responsibility that we are in fact moved to do anything about them, but, more 
dramatically, our own artificialization and automation of ourselves and our 
environment in the pursuit of ever-ramifying self-improvement proffers for us 
novel risks of constantly extending severity and scope. And, though it is shot 
through with risk, this cannot be a justification to reject our oncoming task, 
because, as Hegel already understood (Pippin 2010), it is only through risking 
everything that an agent can truly say they are responsible for themselves, 
because it is only by jeopardizing our commitments that we correct incorrect 
beliefs so as to become increasingly responsible for ourselves and our actions and, 
thus, become ever-more justified in referring to ourselves with the epithet 
 
2 In this, the German intellectual deployed the term ‘existential risk’—or, something very close to it—
decades before Nick Bostrom coined it in the context of futurology. 
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‘rational’.  
And so, we are so much as even able to become concerned about our future 
as a species because we are beings with a history. We became concerned for the 
future because we are self-constituting creatures that, through the work of our 
ongoing history of self-constitution, come to take responsibility for themselves—
whether through building ever-more-accurate theoretical models of reality or by 
fabricating technologies that may automate our practical will within it. 
5 
The idea of Homo sapiens as a self-constituting animal is intimately connected to 
the picture of it as the not-yet-decided being. This pairing goes back to Kant. 
Crucially, it has long been also positioned as the explanatory basis and root of 
our aptitude for prostheses and prospection, or, automation and anticipation. As 
the German philosophical anthropologist Arnold Gehlen (1904-1976) put it in 
1940: 
Man is an acting being. In a narrower sense, he is also ‘underdetermined’—he 
presents a challenge to himself. […] Because man, dependent upon his own 
initiative, may fail to meet this vital challenge, he is an endangered being facing a 
real chance of perishing. Man is ultimately an anticipatory (vorsehend) being. Like 
Prometheus, he must direct his energies toward what is removed, what is not 
present in time, and space. Unlike animals, he lives for the future and not in the 
present. This disposition is one of the preconditions for an acting existence, and 
human consciousness must be understood from this point of view. Indeed, all the 
aspects of man, which should be kept in mind through the ensuing discussion, are 
actually elaborations of the basic characteristic of man—action. We shall see that 
many of the isolated statements about man are really developments of one basic 
point of view—that man represents Nature’s experiment with an acting being. 
(Gehlen 1988, 24-26) 
‘Acting’ here entails automation and anticipation, prosthetic and prospection, by 
its very definition: for ‘acting’ means making yourself what you are—fabricating and 
forging yourself according to some plan—such that ‘the actor’ is at once its own 
technology and its own future. 
This potent and persuasive picture of the human as the ‘not-yet-decided’ 
being goes back to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) but also to Johann Gottfried 
Herder (1744-1803). Herder called us the ‘Mängelwesen’ or ‘creature of deficiencies’. 
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Nietzsche later called us the ‘not-yet-finished’ being. This is because the human 
organism remained underdetermined, underspecialized, and underdeveloped 
physiologically and adaptively: it is ‘no longer an infallible machine in the hands 
of Nature’, Herder (2002, 82) noted. But this inheritance of a lack of 
predetermined instinct is, of course, also positioned as precisely the key to 
humanity’s planetary success: because such underdetermination, as a lack of the 
claustrophobias of overspecialization, endows the human with a unique level of 
behavioral leeway and cognitive lability (Moss 2008). Modern biology continues 
to endorse this basic notion by citing the extravagant ‘neoteny’ of Homo sapiens 
(Gould 2008): the prolonged retention of childhood features later into adulthood, 
which, in delaying the developmental crystallization of brain-structure compared 
to other primates, prolongs the critical window of neural plasticity seemingly 
required for the uptake of unique features like languages with recursive grammar 
(Vyshedskiy 2019). (Which, undoubtedly, is also behind our unique capacities for 
foresight.) Yet, prior to modern scientific investigation into this thesis, the 
continental tradition of ‘philosophical anthropology’ has long championed this 
vision of humanity as the ‘not-yet-determined’ creature.  
Central to this strain of thinking, the declaration of humanity’s biotic 
deficiency was also proposed as the veritable birth of technicity and the trigger 
behind automation. Or, humanity makes up for its deficiencies by shooting forth 
grand prostheses into the world. 
6 
Ernst Kapp (1808-1896)  called this ‘organ-projection’, Paul Alsberg (1883-1965) 
called it ‘body-liberation’, Alfred J. Lotka (1880-1949) called it ‘exosomatic 
evolution’, and André Leroi-Gourhan (1911-1986) called it ‘exteriorization’, but 
the principle remains the same: becoming delaminated from particularized 
specializations and adaptations, the human ekes out an existence for itself by 
being forced to invent technologies, to externalize its bodily functions, to automate its 
means of survival, and thus to artificialize its environment. 
The spread of humanity over the planet was accompanied by the creation of new 
(artificial) organs and coverings. The purpose of humanity is to change all that is 
natural, a free gift of nature, into what is created by work. 
(Fedorov [1906] 1990, 96) 
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So wrote the Russian cosmist Nikolaĭ Fedorov (1829-1903). Contemporaries 
spoke of the ‘psychozoicization’ (i.e. the artificialization) of the entire earth system 
as the exteriorization of human cerebral function. During the early decades of 
the 1900s, that is, American and Russian geoscientists, such as Joseph LeConte 
(1823-1901) and Aleksei Petrovich Pavlov (1854-1929), endeavored to baptize a 
newly-ascendant ‘Psychozoic’ or ‘Anthropogene’ era of terrestrial evolution 
(Biello 2017, 54-55): classified by the wholesale capture of the earth system in 
intentional activities. The human had assembled itself through its own labor so 
as to give to arational nature a rationally justified telos: and this purposive end 
was that of a fully artificialized earth, inaugurated by human civilization’s total 
sequestration of their home-planet’s energy flows. (This, of course, was the 
twentieth-century precursor to twenty-first-century propositions of an 
‘Anthropocene’.) The forward-thinking geochemist Vladimir Vernadsky (1863-
1945) and the Jesuit paleontologist-cosmologist Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) 
wrote of this as the addition of an entirely novel component to the earth system 
(in excess of the biosphere and lithosphere): the ‘noosphere’. Chardin, in his 
sweeping and ambitious Phenomenon of  Man of 1955, wrote of this as the planet 
gaining a ‘new skin’ in the form of artificial reason and its automated products, 
whereby this ‘sudden deluge of cerebralisation, [this] invasion of a new [species] 
which gradually eliminates or subjects all forms of life that are not human, this 
irresistible tide of fields and factories, this immense and growing edifice of matter 
and ideas [seems] to proclaim that there has been a change on the earth [of] 
planetary magnitude’ (Chardin 1959, 183). 
No longer automating and externalizing itself by outsourcing physical labor 
to Paleolithic tools, Geist now externalizes itself at a planetary-scale. Indeed, 
modern studies have estimated that what is now called the ‘technosphere’—the 
sum of all human-produced material within the earth system—now weighs 
around 30 trillion tons. Already in 1955, Chardin realized (1959, 183), indeed, that 
observant aliens would notice the earth not because of its biosignatures but 
because of its technosignatures (to use the parlance of modern SETI). 
7 
But the same lineage of thinkers have also long noticed that such automation 
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comes with trade-offs. The deficient creature, alienated from all instinct and fixed 
behavior, is expelled from all un-self-reflecting existential harmony into an 
increasingly artefactual, model-based, and de-semantified world of number and 
theory and symbol and formal languages (Floridi 2017), becoming solely 
responsible for its own subsistence and world-manufacture in the process. Science 
is the refusal of the inherited world in the pursuit of constructing of a better—
albeit artificialized and alienating—one (Sellars 1962). Indeed, insofar as a 
creature is self-conscious and thus self-constituting it no longer ‘has’ a world 
without actively (that is, artificially and artefactually) constituting it for itself.3 ‘It 
must create a new equilibrium for everything that had formerly been so neatly 
arranged in its small inner world’, as Chardin (1959, 226) declared. The Jesuit 
orthogeneticist saw this as a miraculous gift but also a ‘formidable risk’ and 
burden—a ‘sickness’ of ‘cosmic gravity’ (232). But this is not all, for with the 
‘increasing complication’ of the fully automated world-system, Chardin was 
acutely aware that ‘we are ever more threatened by internal dangers at the core 
of both the biosphere and the noosphere’. Or, in other words, risk escalation is 
internal to modernity’s own planetized apparatus of risk control and preemption. 
Yet, what ‘dangers’ lurk within? ‘Onslaughts or microbes, organic counter-
evolutions, sterility, war, revolution’, Chardin ventures (274-295). And what could 
these ‘counter-evolutions’ be, specifically? Earlier, Chardin had prognosed the 
arrival of what we now call synthetic biology (Roosth 2017); that is, the automation 
and artificialization of life itself, or, in Chardin’s words, the ‘remodeling’ of biotic 
systems. He writes: 
Of old, the forerunners of our chemists strove to find the philosophers’ stone. Our 
ambition has grown since then. It is no longer to find gold but life; and in view of 
all that has happened in the last fifty years, who would dare to say that this is a 
mere mirage? With our knowledge of hormones we appear to be on the eve of 
having a hand in the development of our bodies and even of our brains. With the 
discovery of genes it appears that we shall soon be able to control the mechanism 
of organic heredity. And with the synthesis of albuminoids imminent, we may well 
one day be capable of producing [a] new wave of organisms, an artificially 
provoked neo-life. (Chardin 1959, 250) 
Presumably, such ‘neo-life’ could represent a usurping ‘counter-evolution’ 
 
3 Science, artificialization, and self-consciousness are all teleologically coincident.  
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(though Chardin’s iron-clad telic optimism prevented him from such explicitness). 
Indeed, this particular notion of the ‘risks’ of intelligence’s automation and 
exteriorization of itself has long been recognized. 
8 
It was, of course, Samuel Butler (1835-1902), already in 1863’s ‘Darwin Among 
the Machines’, who posited that the automation of intelligence would eventually 
leave the biological human organism behind. Foreseeing in machinery the 
potential for ‘an entirely new class of life’, Butler (1872, 203) predicted that we 
would eventually become mere pollinators for the purposes of machine 
reproduction. Because in automation there is, as Marx ([1867] 1988, 23:128) had 
already noted, a reversal of ‘subject & object’ and ‘means & ends’—a ‘thingification 
of  persons’ and ‘personification of  things’. Butler merely extrapolated from this, 
nothing that ‘even now machines will only serve on condition of being served, 
and that too upon their own terms’: 
How many men at this hour are living in a state of bondage to the machines? How 
many spend their whole lives, from the cradle to the grave, in tending them by 
night and day? Is it not plain that the machines are gaining ground upon us, when 
we reflect on the increasing number of those who are bound down to them as 
slaves, and of those who devote their whole souls to the advancement of the 
mechanical kingdom? […] what an army of servants do the machines thus employ! 
Are there not probably more men engaged in tending machinery than in tending 
men? Do not machines eat as it were by mannery? Are we not ourselves creating 
our successors in the supremacy of the earth? (Butler 1872, 201) 
Ultimately, he saw that the human organism would become the reproductive 
organ of the machine phylum, as ‘the humble bee is a part of the reproductive 
system of the clover’. Almost a century later, the French paleoanthropologist 
André Leroi-Gourhan (1911-1986) extended this line of thought yet further, 
claiming that the contemporaneous ‘exteriorization’ of the ‘human motor 
brain’—in the production of autonomously locomoting robots—represents ‘the 
penultimate possible stage of the process [of automation] begun by the 
Australanthrope armed with a chopper’: 
Beyond [this], hardly anything more can be imagined other than the 
exteriorization of intellectual thought through the development of machines 
capable not only of exercising judgement (that stage is already here) but also of 
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injecting affectivity into their judgement, taking sides, waxing enthusiastic, or being 
plunged into despair at the immensity of their task.  
Following Butler, Leroi-Gourhan ([1964-5] 1993, 248) foresaw that ‘[once] 
Homo sapiens [has] equipped such machines with the mechanical ability to 
reproduce themselves, there would be nothing left for the human to do but 
withdraw into the paleontological twilight’. Indeed, as automation graduates from 
physical labor to the labors of mind we must accept that our ‘cerebral cortex’ will 
itself also inevitably be externalized. He continued: 
The human species adjusted with equanimity to being overtaken in the use of its 
arms, its legs, and its eyes because it was confident of unparalleled power higher 
up. In the last few years the overtaking has reached the cranial box. Looking facts 
in the face we may wonder what will be left of us once we have produced a better 
artificial version of everything we have got. (1993, 265) 
Accordingly, the biotic human becomes nothing but a ‘living fossil’ within the 
newly ascendant technosphere—persisting only as a type of inertia of the past—
whilst terrestrial intelligence accordingly buds off from the legacy system that is 
its biology. A ‘paleontological twilight’ of our own assembly, but one authored 
accidentally insofar as what innocently began as the furtherance of biological 
survival by way of machinic means clandestinely slides into the installation of 
mechanization as an end-in-itself (indeed, even the diehard optimist Chardin 
noted that we are ‘discovering that something is developing in the world by means 
of us, perhaps at our expense’). A fossilization without necessarily dying. Yet we 
must ‘go even further in exteriorizing [our] faculties’, Leroi-Gourhan (1993, 265) 
resolutely declared: it is the very obligation of the self-constituting animal to 
reconstitute itself through operationalizing its endowment of underspecialization; 
its very nature is to artificialize itself, even if this means obsolescing its 
evolutionary legacy and becoming deracinated from its terrestrial ancestry. 
Indeed, remember, again, that the very definition of intelligence is capability to 
do what is right in spite of the contingent (that is, merely genealogical) placement 
of oneself within space and time so as to drift (no matter how fallibly and 
imperfectly) towards the nowhere and nowhen of universalizable justness. 
Talking, during the 1920s, of the artificialization of our bodies and minds that 
this will demand of us, the communist crystallographer and futurist J.D. Bernal 
(1901-1971) already anticipated that such dramatic ‘changes’ elicit ‘conservative 
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feelings’ of ‘distaste and hatred’. Yet, perhaps, this is only the protesting voice of 
our ultimately reactionary filiation to our contingent evolutionary history 
talking—as a form of unreasoned parochialism, chauvinism, and bias—rather 
than any constancy to an ideal of ‘intellection’ or ‘autonomy’ progressively 
stripped of any remaining genealogical residue of unjustified and unjustifiable 
kinship to any contingently particular bloodline, biology, or, indeed, biosphere. 
9 
The German intellectual Hans Blumenberg (1920-1996), who also equated 
humanity’s ‘lack of adaption’ to its ‘capacity for foresight’ and ‘anticipation’ 
([1979] 1988, 4), took Leroi-Gourhan’s paleontological twilight literally. He 
imagined some non-human paleontologist, many eons hence, discovering the 
remains of humans but not the remains, per impossible, of their technological 
empire. All the observer would see, of course, is a biped creature of no real note, 
not a creature that ‘has transformed the world as no other living being has done 
in the billion years of life’s history’ (Blumenberg 2006, 582). (In this, we see that 
what we call ‘the human’ is no longer exclusively biological and has already 
become indistinguishable from its prostheses.) Reversing the thought experiment, 
Blumenberg imagines a future observer looking upon the fossilized human 
organism alongside the intact geological remains of its planet-girdling 
technosphere. What would our future scientist make of the strange fossil remains 
of a neotenic primate amongst these vast machines? Blumenberg noted that they 
would inevitably see the human only as a parasite living off the machinic phylum. 
‘Man likewise becomes a parasite within the technological sphere of life’, 
Blumenberg (2006, 590) declared. (Indeed, more recently, geologists (Zalasiewicz 
et al. 2017) have noted that if a future geologist was to categorize ‘technofossils’ as 
‘species’, the variety of the technosphere would actually outnumber that of the 
biosphere—or, technodiversity has already overtaken biodiversity.) The human 
organism eventually erases itself: becoming the mere parasite of its ramifying 
prostheses. 
Blumenberg based this reasoning on the fact that parasites gradually lose 
their ‘equipment of self-sufficiency’ (i.e. sensory and locomotor apparatus) 
because they piggyback off the inputs and influxes ‘of the host organism’. This 
theory of parasitism-as-atrophy-of-individuation goes back to the invertebrate 
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zoologist Ray Lankester (1847-1929). He argued that parasitism caused once fully 
individuated organisms to phylogenetically degenerate into less individuated and 
more primitive forms. His model organism was the Sacculina, a genus of barnacles 
that parasitize crabs by attaching to their underside, castrating and sterilizing 
them, thus to hijack the crab’s parental instinct by tricking the host into nurturing 
the barnacle as if this imposter was the crab’s own egg-sack. Beginning life as a 
differentiated and metameric organism, the Sacculina, once it anchors itself to a 
host, degenerates into an undifferentiated and primitive pseudo-gonad. ‘Any new 
set of conditions occurring to an animal which render its food and safety very 
easily attained, seem to lead as a rule to Degeneration’: let ‘the parasitic life once 
be secured’, Lankester (1880, warned, ‘and away go legs, jaws, eyes, and ears; the 
active, highly gifted crab may become a mere sac, absorbing nourishment’ . 
Making the inevitable comparison to the increasingly automated means of 
subsistence and attendant levels of comfort spreading throughout the developed 
world, the parasitologist feared for the future of humanity: for, ‘just as an active 
healthy man sometimes degenerates when he becomes suddenly possessed of a 
fortune’, industrialized humanity could be becoming a mere parasitic appendage 
upon the technosphere. Could human intelligence perfect its world—through 
automating all its comforts—only to obsolesce into the ‘paleontological twilight’ 
by essentially removing the very stressors and drivers that motivate intelligence’s 
evolutionary persistence? Lankester (1880, 60) pondered thus: ‘Perhaps we are all 
drifting, tending to the condition of intellectual Barnacles’.  
10 
In 1927, the polymath biostatistician J.B.S Haldane (who, besides giving us the 
word ‘clone’, also coined the term ‘ectogenesis’ to refer to the process of 
automating human reproduction with artificial wombs) wrote an essay titled 
‘Possible Worlds’. Suitably enough, he therein compared humans to a race of 
‘thinking barnacles’ so as to illustrate how our ‘world-building’—i.e. our process 
of cognitively manufacturing an objective reality for ourselves—is constrained 
and canalized by our biology. The thought experiment involves illustrating how 
a race of sessile, yet sapient, barnacles would philosophize about their world, 
given their inherited sensory apparatus. Having established the rooting of one’s 
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worldedness in one’s biophysical hardware by way of this extended fable on the 
philosophical system-building of the ‘thinking barnacles’, Haldane (often the 
utopian futurist) moves to imply that, should we humans become able to 
artificially edit and intervene in our biology, then we will one day become 
empowered to ‘look at existence from the point of view of non-human minds’ 
(that is, should we choose to de-sanctify the biological category of ‘the human’ 
and technically seize the means of its world-production). This leaves us two 
options: 
Man’s little world will end. The human mind can already envisage that end. If 
humanity can enlarge the scope of its will as it has enlarged the reach of its intellect, 
it will escape that end. If not, the judgement will have gone out against it, and man 
and all his works will perish eternally. (Haldane 1972, 312) 
Un another essay, Haldane (1937, 143) was stark: if humanity did not 
undertake a self-constituting hand in its own evolution, then it will either 
degenerate like the parasite or go extinct. He pointed to the barnacle: “The 
ancestors of oysters and barnacles had heads. […] Man may just as easily lose his 
intelligence”. 
In an oncoming age of synthetic biology and robotics, biologist-philosophers 
will no longer be constrained to interpret our world but will have to undertake 
an active hand in changing it. (Haldane, it should be no surprise, was a dedicated 
communist.) For then we would truly become entitled to the title of ‘self-
fabricating animal’. Crucially, this diagnosis of dilemma between human self-
obsolescence and self-transcendence comes in an essay on the inevitability of 
eventual human extinction should we not branch out into outer space; yet, as 
Haldane makes very clear, such extropian exodus will require the total 
reengineering of our organism. Indeed, the essay, suitably entitled ‘The Last 
Judgement’, relays the story of a far-flung future wherein our descendants have 
branched or undergone speciation. It is recounted from the perspective of the 
posthuman descendants who have left Earth and have undertaken the task of 
artificializing their anciently inherited simian biology in order to become 
progressively answerable to intelligence’s cosmist task. The parable revolves 
around this successor species observing, from the new home on Venus, the 
inevitable extinction of their Earth-bound human progenitors. This is because 
the humans of Earth, having refused the call to reengineer themselves, have 
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instead focused their technologies on the achievement of ‘individual happiness’ 
and on the automation of a statement of utopic satiation, such that they essentially 
rarefy and subtilize themselves out of existence. Embodying Lankester’s fears, 
intelligence’s own success over its environment again here leads to its downfall: 
having eliminated the ‘pain sense’ in the pursuit of comfort and having retained 
the human-form for parochial reasons of anthropocentric aesthetics, the old-
world inhabitants focus their biotechnic powers on horticultural pleasantries 
rather than human reinvention—or, they cultivate appealing aesthetics rather 
than pursue practical science—such that they come to contemplate ‘the death of 
their species with less aversion than their own [individual demise], and no 
effective measures were taken to forestall the approaching doom’ of their kind 
(Haldane 1927, 300). They can see their extinction coming (in the form of a 
decaying moon orbit) but do nothing to stop it. Becoming Lankester’s intellectual 
barnacle, human civilization essentially self-obsolesces: in stagnating in its own 
success over its immediate environment, happy to pursue preternatural pleasures 
rather than reengineering itself in the pursuit of further frontiers, it removes its 
very motivating conditions of existence such that it goes willingly and gently into 
the cosmic night. In this parable, we realize that ‘survival’, for ‘the human’, 
extends beyond mere biological persistence; ‘the human’ is not surviving unless 
it is thriving, or constantly surpassing itself; such that the pursuit of biotic 
persistence alone paradoxically leads to its self-obsolescence. Again, as Hegel 
argued, it is only in being willing to risk one’s life—and putting one’s organic 
existence entirely on the line—that one can truly be recognized and 
acknowledged as a fully rational agent compelled by just reasons rather than 
organismic drives. The same applies to the ‘survival’ of the human species; 
inasmuch as we are not just a biological germline but a self-transcending project, 
our ‘survival’ lies somewhere beyond mere persistence. 
In another essay, ‘Man’s Destiny’, Haldane (1937, 145) was even more explicit: 
unless he can control his own evolution as he is learning to control that of his 
domestic plants and animals, man and all his works will go down into oblivion and 
darkness. 
J.D. Bernal ([1929] 2017, 42), a close friend of Haldane, shared this sentiment: 
Normal man is an evolutionary dead end; mechanical man, apparently a break in 
organic evolution, is actually more in the true tradition of a further evolution. 
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A few decades earlier, Fedorov ([1906] 1990, 97) had similarly declared that if 
we fail in this task of interplanetary diaspora and relentless reinvention then we 
have nothing left to do but become ‘passively fossilized in contemplating the slow 
destruction of our [planetary] home and graveyard’. For Haldane (1927, 309) it 
was clear: in ‘the outer planets the human brain may alter in such a way as to 
open up possibilities inconceivable to our own minds’; or, in other words, we have 
seen nothing yet when it comes to the ‘possibility space’ generated by the 
Mängelwesen’s coming to answer its calling as the truly self-constituting creature 
through unlimited technificiation of itself. Yet in the expedient present—in the 
here-and-now where everything that will have been is decided—the creaturely 
Homo sapiens is ‘only a little freer than a barnacle’, Haldane (1927, 279) noted. We 
are little better off than his thought-experimental crustacea. Our ‘bodily and 
mental activities are fairly rigidly confined to those which have had survival value 
to our ancestors during the last few million generations’.  
11 
Only five years prior, in 1922, the American endocrinologist Louis Berman, in 
his book The Glands Regulating Personality, had expanded Butler’s fears of the 
biological human’s oncoming supersession in the face of greater intelligences: 
Just as certainly as man has arisen from something whose bones alone remain as 
reminders of his existence, we are persuaded that man himself is to be the ancestor 
of another creature, differing as much from him as he from the Chimpanzee, and 
who, if he will not supplant and wipe him out, will probably segregate him and 
allow him to play out his existence in cage cities. (Berman 1922, 12) 
This vaticination, of course, sounds like today’s predictions on the risks of 
future artificial superintelligence. Yet Berman, like Haldane, was also prescient 
in noting that, in the face of accelerating technological progress, the true threat 
may not truly come from the fully artificialized future but from its deepest 
evolutionary past. In line with Haldane’s comments on our ‘rigidly’ inherited 
habits, Berman noted that life ‘has blundered supremely, in, while making brains 
its darling, forgetting or helplessly surrendering to the egoisms of alimentation’. 
Life becomes ever-more endowed in its faculties of cunning but remains ever 
beholden to the brute instrumentality of ‘alimentation’ such that the former 
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becomes merely the empowerment of the tragedies of the latter.  
So [life] has spawned a conflict between its organs, and a consequent impasse in 
which the lower centers drive the higher pitilessly into devising means and 
instruments for the suicide of the whole. 
Ramifying our intelligent means of  achieving our organic ends just empowers the disastrous 
reach of  our organismic stupidity. Again, as Chardin later explicated, the species 
doesn’t simply artificialize the earth—and automate its planetary environ so as to 
bring it under predictive control—without in the process breeding ever more 
novel perils. Or, the more complexified our planetary apparatus of computation 
becomes, the more complexities there are to compute, such that technoscience’s 
project of prediction breeds its own unpredictabilities. (Look to the digital 
computer: emerging during World War II as a technology of anticipation, it has, 
in many ways, only made our world more intractable—opening up previously 
unanticipated vistas of conflict in the arena of cyberwarfare.) ‘The fully 
enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant’, after all—as Adorno & 
Horkheimer ([1944] 1997, 3) wrote, two decades after Berman, at the tail end of 
the second conflagration of global war during the century. Writing in the 
aftermath of the first (and looking to the onward-rolling automation of the means 
of murder), Berman (1922, 13) darkly declared: 
As War shows plainly to the most stupidly gross imagination, the germs of our own 
self-destruction as a species saturate our blood. The probability looms with almost 
the certainty of a syllogistic deduction that such will be the outcome to our 
hundreds of thousands of years of pain upon earth. In face of that, speculations 
upon a comet or gaseous emanations hitting the planet, or the sun growing cold, 
become babyish fancies. 
The sleep of reason produces monsters. This sentiment persists today. Note 
the 2012 comments of the transhumanist utilitarian David Pearce (2012):  
I think the single greatest underlying risk to the future of intelligence life isn’t 
technological, but both natural and evolutionarily ancient, namely competitive 
male dominance behavior. […] For the foreseeable future, all technological threats 
must be viewed through this sinister lens. Last century, male humans killed over 
100 million fellow humans in conflict and billions of nonhumans. Directly or 
indirectly, this century we are likely to kill many more. But perhaps we’ll do so in 
more sophisticated ways. 
Almost a century prior to Pearce, Berman filled in the question of what 
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‘sophisticated’ might mean. The endocrinologist proclaimed that our extinction 
would likely arrive from the impending ‘use in the next War’ of synthetic 
pathogens and weaponized pandemics. And so, the gravest risk to our species is 
that the fully automated future lubricates the recidivist return of our deepest past 
in the form of amplifying and empowering humanity’s most ancestral 
inclinations. Exteriorizing our encephalon also entails externalizing (i.e. granting 
disastrously concrete reality to) some of our eldest demons. Can our progressive 
history outpace our evolutionary genealogy? Berman (1922, 13-14) wasn’t hopeful: 
The memories of the cold lone fish and hot predatory carnivore who were our 
begetters, may haunt us to the end of time [because they will set in motion] the 
self-and-species murdering inventions and discoveries that are apparently destined 
to slay us. 
 
The fully enlightened earth radiates disaster, indeed. Evolutionarily ancestral 
urges—not the modern technologies that focus them—may be the ultimate 
existential risk.  
12 
Despite already being announced in preliminary form by the thinkers above, the 
behavioral basis of this notion was first made scientifically explicit in the 1950s by 
Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907-1988) through his ground-breaking work on ethnology. 
Tinbergen (1951) noticed that evolutionarily-inherited instincts could be 
‘hijacked’, so as to become damaging rather than utile to the organism, when the 
stimulus that triggered the behavior was sufficiently exaggerated beyond its 
evolutionary context—whether such hyperbolism happens by way of parasitic 
impersonation or artificial fabrication. Tinbergen called this ‘supernormal 
stimulus’. He noticed that animals prefer the hyperbolic simulacra to the ‘real 
thing’ if the former is suitably supernormal: for example, cuckoo chicks exhibit 
exaggerated versions of the cues that illicit parental care in their warbler hosts to 
the detriment of the host’s actual offspring; or, infamously, jewel beetles waste 
time and energy attempting to mate with discarded beer bottles whose reflections 
resemble more intense versions of the carapaces of their female conspecifics. 
Of course, we humans—having comprehensively automated our means of 
survival and artificialized our environment—now live almost entirely in a world 
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of supernormal stimuli (Mackay, 2017): whether semiotic, narcotic, pornographic, 
culinary, and doxastic. Hence the hypermodern plagues of the fully enlightened 
earth: escapist isolation, opioid epidemics, porn addiction, skyrocketing obesity, 
fake news. Already in 1898, doctors were commenting that we were tending 
‘towards living to eat instead of eating to live’ (Gillespie 1898, v). Indeed, it was 
supernormal products (from sugar to cinema) that industrial automation enabled 
that have, over time, caused our species to increasingly divert its resources (its 
‘mannery’) toward facilitating the procreation and reproduction of the ‘species’ 
of the incipient technosphere. Industry is our Sacculina: diverting our resources to 
the siring and rearing of an entirely new machinic phylum. Means and ends 
reverse as our ancient instincts become hijacked for the end of constructing a 
planetary as our ancient instincts become hijacked for the end of constructing a 
planetary film of machinery and artifice. Are we drifting the direction of the jewel 
beetle? 
Blumenberg (2006, 590), in propositioning that Homo sapiens increasingly 
‘becomes a parasite within the technological sphere’, spoke of the dwindling 
‘reality-contact’ (Wirklichkeitskontakt) of our species in its ratcheting pursuit of 
supernormal replacements for the strife of the real. Like Lankester’s parasite, an 
atrophy of the ‘organs of self-sufficiency’ is undergone—both in somatic terms 
and in terms of spirit. Indeed, already in 1966 (just over a decade after Tinbergen’s 
breakthroughs), the sci-fi author J.G. Ballard (1966) wrote of his contemporary 
moment as one wherein ‘the fictional elements in the world around us are 
multiplying to the point where it is almost impossible to distinguish the “real” and 
the “false”—the terms no longer have any meaning’. As we exteriorize our 
encephalon, at increasingly planetized scales, any meaningful distinction 
between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ progressively collapses. We increasingly live in a 
world of our own making. Yet, in the form of superstimulus hijack, this planetary-
scale artificialization—achieved through automating our means of 
alimentation—comes with its own endogenous risks: basically, the more we 
externalize our cerebrum the more it becomes seized by our ancestral limbic 
system; the more we lurch into the technologized future the more we become 
entrapped in our genealogical past. 
Haldane, all the way back in the 1920s, had anticipated the existential risk of 
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superstimuli in his parable of the ‘Last Judgement’: depicting a future humanity 
that becomes so immured by the pursuit of cultivating supernormal artefacts and 
luxuries that it drops out of concrete existence entirely. Much more recently, the 
AI researcher Eliezer Yudkowsky (2007) has picked up on this theme, musing that 
‘[p]erhaps the demographic collapse of advanced societies happens because the 
market supplies ever-more-tempting alternatives to having children, while the 
attractiveness of changing diapers remains constant over time’. He talks, darkly, 
of the capacity for the human species to market itself out of existence. This fear, 
manifesting as the concern that such dynamics may be a fatal vulnerability ‘baked 
into’ intelligence itself, likewise extends to discussion of AIs: Steve Omohundro 
(2008) writes of the potential for an AI to pursue ‘counterfeit’ rather than ‘genuine 
utility’, to hack its own goal-system so that it damagingly pursues artificial forms 
of success rather than the real thing. He pictures a chess-master AI that, instead 
of playing actual games of chess, merely increments its internal counter of ‘games 
won’. This is exactly the same as human drug-addicts pursuing superstimuli. 
Indeed, a fear amongst futurologists has long been the capacity for humans to 
become ‘wireheads’: beings who pursue virtual bliss to the detriment of their 
material existence. Bernal ([1929] 2017, 68-71), once again, had already come to 
this conclusion in the 1920s, writing that the ability to edit emotional states would 
be ‘excessively dangerous for human beings’—because we would prefer artificial 
states of ‘ecstatic happiness’ to the hardships of reality. His only hope was that 
‘the man of the future’ will ‘have discovered that happiness is not an end of life’. 
He wished that ‘we may, in time, come to live to think instead of thinking to live’. 
13 
Bernal’s own 1929 masterpiece, The World, The Flesh, and the Devil, put this knife-
edge drama between evolutionary past and promised future centerstage, with 
each member of the title’s troika presenting an obstacle to humanity’s mission of 
materially asserting itself at increasingly galactic levels. (Bernal, that is, 
anticipated Nikolai Khardashev and Freeman Dyson’s later notion of largescale 
astroengineering projects with his proposal that advanced civilizations eventually 
become ‘stellivores’ by harnessing the power of suns (see Vidal 2016).) The first 
obstacle (‘The World’) represented inorganic nature, the second (‘The Flesh’) 
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represented human physiology, and the third (‘The Devil’) represented our 
psychological drives and libidinal architecture. With this latter, Bernal ([1929] 
2017, 55-57) limns a dialectically deadly struggle between psychologically 
‘primitive forces’ and the ‘super ego’, wherein humanity may become satiated by 
sufficient automation of its environs such that it luxuriates in self-created inertia 
and thereby becomes stagnant ‘until it is destroyed by cosmic forces’. ‘This may 
be closer than we think (if it is not already passed)’, the crystallographer warned. 
Indeed, ‘it would seem that the present time is a very critical one for the evolution 
of human desire’: because the reengineering of libidinal drives may itself now be 
within our reach, such that we may escape potential lock-in of the rut of 
supernormal stagnancy, and be led ‘to the stars’; because the human, as the self-
constituting being that is concerned with thriving rather than merely surviving, 
will have aborted itself to the extent that it does not ‘need a real externalization 
in the transforming of the universe and itself ’. Indeed, in Haldane’s (1927, 301) 
vision of the future, the posthuman descendants of extinct humanity declare that 
they owe their capacity to outmaneuver their evolutionary-genealogical history 
‘to the presence in our nuclei of genes such as H149 and P783c, which determine 
certain features of cerebral organization that had no analogy on earth’.  
Of course, in the joint vision of Haldane and Bernal, the conservatism of the 
human-as-organism may refuse this opportunity and condemn the project of the 
human-as-vocation to abortive failure. ‘[W]e hold the future still timidly’, Bernal 
([1929] 2017, 81) wrote, 
but perceive it for the first time, as a function of our own action. Having seen it, 
are we to turn away from something that offends the very nature of our earliest 
desires, or is the recognition of our new powers sufficient to change those desires 
into the service of the future which they will have to bring about? 
Haldane and Bernal’s compatriot, H.G. Wells (1866-1946) famously 
proclaimed that ‘civilization is a race between education and catastrophe’. 
Perhaps it would be better to say that it is race between our deepest past and our 
promised future: between the most-ancestral atavisms of evolution and the 
further-flung prospect of progress. A few decades later, during the height of the 
Cold War, the systems theorist and architect Buckminster Fuller (1895-1983) 
echoed this powerful sentiment. He augured that the ‘comprehensive 
introduction of automation everywhere around the earth will free man from 
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being an automaton and will generate so fast a mastery and multiplication of 
[energetic] wealth’ that we will be enabled to leave this ‘spaceship Earth’ so as to 
‘be swiftly outwardbound to occupy ever greater ranges of universe’: 
Within decades we will know whether man is going to be a physical success around 
earth, able to function in ever greater patterns of local universe or whether he is 
going to frustrate his own success with his negatively conditioned reflexes of 
yesterday and will bring about his own extinction […]. My intuitions foresee his 
success despite his negative inertias. This means things are going to move fast. 
(Fuller 1963, 362) 
Regardless of Fuller’s ‘intuitions’ regarding earth-originating sapience, it was 
only a decade earlier that Enrico Fermi had asked why other, elder species that 
had accomplished such ‘outwardbound’ expansion were not easily visible. After 
all, we are relatively late-coming as a terrestrial planet on the galactic scene. This, 
of course, is the Fermi Paradox. (‘Why do we not see spacefaring 
exocivilizations?’ the question goes. And the answer is often: ‘perhaps this 
absence tells us something troubling about our own future’.) More recently, 
supernormal stimuli have been conscripted as explanans for the eerie silence of outer 
space.  
In a recent paper entitled ‘The Intelligence Paradox: will ET get the 
metabolic syndrome?’ (Nunn, Geoffrey, and Bell 2014), a team of metabolic 
scientists point to the skyrocketing annual clinical costs of obesity across the 
developed world, whilst comparing this to NASA’s budget per annum. The latter 
is dwarfed by the former—by an eyewatering order of magnitude. The authors 
argue we may already be spending too much on healthcare, because of our 
addiction to supernormal food, to afford to go to the stars. We are becoming too 
obese, as a species, to leave our planet: we are already allocating too many of our 
resources to palliation. By way of evoking dietary superstimuli of our artificial 
world, they point to a potential ‘Intelligence Paradox’ that is generalizable across 
exo-biospheres and thus is the explanation for the cosmic silence first noted by 
Enrico Fermi in 1950 (Jones 1985). As Nunn, Geoffrey and Bell sum up their own 
recently-proposed explanation for Fermi's question: 
Throughout evolution the need to adapt has been driven by a stressful 
environment, suggesting that if intelligence ever evolved to a high enough level, it 
would alter the environment to remove the stress. This would thus remove the 
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driver for further development of intelligence and adaptability (and hence 
longevity). However, if it reached a high enough level, it may well also fulfil the 
original [thermodynamic] driver of life itself: acceleration of entropy. Thus, it is 
possible that mankind, or ET, may be reaching a point where the original driver 
for entropy is still occurring through technology, but the individual driver for 
intelligence and adaptability has been removed. The universe could be playing a 
very cruel joke on us. (2014, 9) 
The technosphere is our Sacculina: it uses us as midwife and surrogate—as its 
avenue into existence—hijacking our resources and efforts at the cost of our own 
health, fertility and reality-contact; yet once we have installed its dissipative 
regime, we are no longer required, and our intelligence inevitably senesces into 
the twilight. Indeed, it has been commented (UoL 2016) that the ‘technosphere 
can be said to have budded off the biosphere and arguably [is now] parasitic on 
it’. Tragically, Lankester’s fears about intelligence’s self-cancelling fate may apply 
not exclusively to terrestrial humanity but to all galactic intelligences across our 
astrobiological landscape. Indeed, as others (such as the astrophysicist Milan M. 
Ćirković (2018, 222-228) and the evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller 
(2006)) have pointed out, our modern overconsumption of supernormal artefacts 
extends far beyond the culinary all the way to the doxastic; when talking about 
‘post-truth’ we are really talking about alethic superstimuli. It may just be the case 
that any sufficiently advanced intelligence, in its reckless endeavor for 
artificialization, gives up all remaining ‘reality-contact’ such that it subtilizes itself 
out of existence. As Berman (1922, 14) had already understood in the 1920s: 
Life begins as a quivering colloid, goes on to painfully build a brain, which 
automatically refines itself to the point of discovering and using the most efficient 
methods of destroying others, and by a boomerang effect, itself. Fate! 
14 
And yet, what if resolute intelligence can outpace its flawed past? what if it can 
outmaneuver is genealogical anchoring to somewhere and somewhen so as to 
move towards nowhere and nowhen? Bernal ([1929] 2017, 46), of course, had 
imagined this sloughing off of our unjust and contingent heritage as the drifting 
towards a more rationally justified alternative: 
Bit by bit the heritage in the direct line of mankind—the heritage of the original 
life emerging on the face of the world—would dwindle, and in the end disappear 
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effectively, being preserved perhaps as some curious relic, while the new life which 
conserves none of the substance and all the spirit of the old would take its place and 
continue its development. 
And, to accomplish this—whilst avoiding the supernormal traps of the 
‘intelligence paradox’—Bernal ([1929] 2017, 68) was aware that we would need 
to edit the very structure of desire itself: 
The immediate future which is our own desire, we seek; in achieving it we become 
different; becoming different we desire something new, so there is no staleness 
except when development itself has stopped. 
Fascinatingly, he saw that this would necessarily lead to the eventual 
sequestration of our libidinal and carnal impulses by the aesthetic goals of 
disinterestedness. As far-future humanity becomes more and more empowered 
over its surrounding environment at ever-increasing (and eventually galactic) 
scales, Bernal ([1929] 2017, 66) prognosed that what had once been called 
‘sexuality’ will inevitably be entirely refitted and rerouted so as to become a pure 
and disinterested artistic impulse toward human expression through the editing 
of the very nomic structures of nature itself. Sex turns into art whilst cosmic 
nomology becomes the expressive medium: 
The cardinal tendency of progress is the replacement of an indifferent environment 
by a deliberately created one. As time goes on, the acceptance, the appreciation, 
even the understanding of nature, will be less and less needed. In its place will come 
the need to determine the desirable form of the humanly-controlled universe which 
is nothing more or less than art. 
Nature would no longer be something to be understood, but something that 
we make. Art would no longer be mimetic but cosmogenic. ‘[T]he motions of 
stars […] could be directed’ by aesthetic judgement, Bernal forecast. In line with 
this, he anticipated that a demiurgic post-humanity—whose ‘new life would be 
more plastic, more directly controllable, and at the same time more variable’—
would eventually become utterly indistinct from its own cosmic environment. As an 
interesting counterproposition to the pessimistic proposal of some astrobiological 
‘Intelligence Paradox’, the Polish futurist Stanisław Lem (1921-2006) proposed 
precisely this ‘Indistinguishability Thesis’ as an optimistic explanation to Fermi’s 
silence: all appropriately ancient (that is to say, sufficiently advanced) 
exocivilizations are not visible to us because they have, through their own 
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mightiness in the endeavor of automating their environment, essentially become 
indistinguishable from the surrounding cosmos itself. We do not see them because 
they are ‘already everywhere’: the laws of  nature are their artefacts (Lem [1971] 1981, 
525).4 Though mind-bending, this thesis is now entertained as a serious 
proposition. Ćirković refers to the idea as ‘post-post-biological evolution’ and 
speculates upon entire planetary ecosystems and galactic structures utilized as 
the computational substrates for the cogitations of vast hyper-intelligences. As 
Chardin (1959, 286) anticipated, ‘[c]onsciousness would thus finally construct 
itself by a synthesis of planetary units’. As the limit case of self-constitution, 
intelligence here no longer artificializes nature but naturalizes artifice—which, surely, is the 
omega point of all automation. 
15 
Yet, in the here and now, we remain limited humans; weighted down by a history 
of self-interestedness and impiety; and, as such, we are always liable to fail. This, 
however, is our precisely our fate as the creature that is its own creation. 
Accordingly, our path to the stars, as Bernal ([1929] 2017, 68) wrote, ‘will always 
be a very critical process’: 
The dangers to the whole structure of humanity and its successors will not decrease 
as their wisdom increases, because, knowing more and wanting more they will dare 
more, and in daring will risk their own destruction. But this daring, this 
experimentation, is really the essential quality of life. 
It is a task we cannot refuse. We recognize our history as a project that makes 
striving for our future meaningful, yet we can always fail this calling inasmuch as 
we are creatures with a delinquent genealogy as much as a self-forged history.  
 
Can the philosophical barnacle outpace its past so as to secure its future? 
 
4 Bernal ([1929] 2017, 79-80) imagined a cosmic post-humanity, having split from terrestrial humanity, 
retaining ‘the old mankind’ in something that now equates to the ‘Zoo Hypothesis’ explanation to Fermi’s 
Paradox (see Ball 1973): ‘Mankind—the old mankind—would be left in undisputed possession of the earth, 
to be regarded by the inhabitants of the celestial spheres with a curious reverence. The world might, in fact, 
be transformed into a human zoo, a zoo so intelligently managed that its inhabitants are not aware that 
they are there merely for the purposes of observation and experiment’. And, if this is even minimally plausible, 
what is to say that we are not already in such a zoo? 
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